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I. INTRODUCTION
Bertrand Russell once observed that "[slociety cannot exist without
law and order, and cannot advance except through vigorous innova-
tors."2 Russell's observation neatly captures a fundamental distinc-
tion between law and science.3 Both disciplines have created vast
social and conceptual structures but for drastically different purposes.
An understanding and recognition of these differences between the so-
cial and conceptual structures of law and science has several concrete
implications for the use of scientific evidence as proof of legal
causation.
The function of law is to provide a mechanism for the peaceful reso-
lution of disputes. In pursuit of this goal, legal rules have incorpo-
1. A homonym is a homophone that has a different meaning. OxFoRD AmEmcAN
DIcTIONARY 313, 419 (Eugene Ehrlich et al. eds., 1980).
2. THE NEW DIcTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 344 (Tryon Edwards et al. eds., 1962).
3. This is something of an oversimplification because science and law are not ho-
mogenous unitary disciplines. Rather, each is composed of numerous subdis-
ciplines or research areas. ThoMAs S. KuIN, THE STucuaaE OF Scirmic
REVOLUTIONs 176-81 (2d ed. 1970) (discussing structure of scientific disciplines).
Kuhn's model has also been applied to "legal science." See, e.g., STIG JORGENSEN,
VALUES iN LAw: IDEAS, PRiNciPLEs AND RULES 9-28 (1978)(discussing effects of
ideology upon science and "legal science"); N.E. SinoNDs, THE DECLNE OF JU-
RDICAL REASON: DocmnuE AND THEORY iN THE LEGAL ORDER 1-14 (1984)(apply-
ing principles similar to Kuhn's). Although these subdisciplines may differ
substantially from one another, these differences will be ignored because the
translation with which this Article is concerned is translation from a specific sci-
entific subdiscipline (often epidemiology) into the legal subdiscipline of tort
litigation.
Similarly, because this Article concerns translation into a legal subdiscipline,
it is written from a legal point of view. Accordingly, meta-legal questions about
whether the law succeeds in its attempts to deal with causation are beyond the
scope of this Article. An anti-realist account of the legal causal inquiry would
deny that legal fact finders identify real causes. However, translation remains
necessary even if an anti-realist account of legal causation is adopted because the
fact finder is operating within the legal paradigm.
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rated a realist4 causal paradigm that posits pre-existing causes "out
there" in the external world. In contrast, scientists seek to advance5
their respective research areas by engaging in experimental research
and disseminating the results to other scientists. This scientific enter-
prise is best explained by an anti-realist causal paradigm. The anti-
realist causal paradigm posits causes that, rather than being "out
there" with real existence, are socially constructed pragmatic fictions.
In contrast to the realism embodied in the law, the anti-realist views
"the theories of science [as] mere calculating devices, useful fictions,
convenient methods of representation, or the like, helpful only for pre-
dicting and organizing" observations. 6
4. The term "realism" has been used in many different ways and therefore must be
carefully defined. For example, one of the great (but for present purposes irrele-
vant) philosophical debates concerns ontological realism. Ontological realism is
the belief that abstract objects called "universals" have an independent and per-
haps even logically prior existence to the physical particulars which are instan-
tiations of those universals. See DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 264 (Dagobert D.
Runes ed., 15th ed. rev. 1960)(defining ontological realism).
A second sense in which the term "realism" is used refers to epistemological
realism. Epistemological realism refers to the belief that one's perceptions of the
world mirror the way the world "really is." Id.; ROBERT AUDI, BELIEF, JUSTFICA-
TION, AND KNOWLEDGE 15-17 (1988). See also BERTRAND RUSSELL, HUrM
KNOWLEDGE: ITs SCOPE AND LIhnrs 319-32 (1962)(discussing relation of epistemo-
logical realism to physics). Realism as used in this Article will refer to a particu-
lar species of epistemological realism that posits that common sense or scientific
theories "give a literally true account of the way the world is." When applied
specifically to scientific theories, this position is referred to as "scientific realism."
Janet A. Kourany, Realism Versus Anti-Realism: The Ontological Import of Sci-
entific Knowledge, in SCIENTIFC KNOWLEDGE: BAsic IssuEs IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 336, 338 (1987) [hereinafter "Kourany I"]. As used herein, realism is
essentially equivalent to a verificationist view of science, although technically,
realism also includes falsificationism. For discussion of verificationism and fal-
sificationism, see infra section IIIA.
5. Although not particularly instructive, the term "advance" has been retained out
of deference to the prevailing conventions. For discussion of the history of ideas
relating to technological advance, see, e.g., THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: A COLLECTION
OF READINGS (Frederick J. Teggart & George H. Hildebrand eds., rev. ed. 1949)
(collecting primary sources); JOHN LOSEE, A HISTOlCuAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 159-20 (2d ed. 1980)(surveying and describing modern
theories). Explanation of the aversion to the term "advance" may be found infra
in sections III.B and 11.C.
6. Kourany I, supra note 4. There are different degrees of commitment to the anti-
realist thesis. Science consists of a mix of observable facts, paradigms that are
generally untestable, and various gradations in between these two extremes.
Thus, the different types of facts encountered by science evoke different degrees
of concern among anti-realists. Many extreme anti-realists, including the author
of this Article, dismiss the distinction between observed data and theory and are
skeptical about even the most directly observable facts. Cf KUHN, supra note 3,
at 50-76. Many less extreme anti-realists (and many who would label themselves
realists) posit the externalized existence of individually observed data, but would
remain skeptical about the existence of entities contained in the more general
hypotheses.
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The differences in structure between the scientific and legal com-
munities have not gone unnoticed. Whereas science "is the American
faith,"7 law fares much more poorly in the eyes of the American pub-
lic.8 Even the legal community has not escaped the influence of the
American fetish for things scientific. Courts frequently uncritically
adopt a verificationist philosophy of science that exaggerates the role
of science in law.9 The thesis of this Article is that because courts do
not adequately consider the sociology of science, they have failed to
recognize the translation difficulties created by the use of scientific ev-
idence, which incorporates an anti-realist concept of causation, to
prove the existence of realist legal causation. Ignorance of these diffi-
culties in the translation of scientific evidence has dramatically in-
creased the risk that scientific evidence will be accidentally misused,
or "mistranslated," by the fact finder.
Part II of this Article examines the role of causation in tort law and
argues that the causation a plaintiff must prove, although expressed
in a single set of legal terms, is based upon either of two realist para-
digms of causation depending upon the identity of the trier of fact.
When a jury is the fact finder, jurors bring their everyday experiences
into the courtroom and apply a "folk paradigm" of causation. The
jury's operative concept of cause-in-fact is a common sense realism
that conceptualizes causation as a relation between two links in a sin-
gle externally existing causal chain. When a judge serves as the trier
of fact, the assessment of causation is no longer made by inexperi-
Fortunately, these disagreements need not be resolved, for causation is not a
directly observable fact but is a more general theoretical construct of science.
Thus, anti-realist concerns are at their peak when examining the issue of causal-
ity. The constructed nature of judgments of causality is highlighted by the
Burch-Lilienfeld debate over the import of the Surgeon General's Report of the
Health Consequences of Smoking. Burch criticizes the inference of causation con-
tained in the report because the data do not permit elimination of the "third vari-
able" or "common cause" problem. P.R.J. Burch, The Surgeon General's
"Epidemiologic Criteria for Causality"' A Critique, 36 J. CHRON. Dis. 821, 821-36
(1983). Lilienfeld rebuts Burch's argument by explicitly recognizing the discre-
tion implicit in "scientific proof" of causation. In an exceedingly candid passage,
Lilienfeld notes that "[g]iven this [existing] body of data in its totality, one arrives
at a scientific judgment that there is a sufficiently high probability that the
causal hypothesis is true." Abraham M. Lilienfeld, The Surgeon General's "Epi-
demiologic Criteria for Causality: A Criticism of Burch's Critique, 36 J. CHRON.
Dis. 837, 838 (1983).
7. John Veilleux, Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEo. L.J. 1967, 1967 (1987).
8. Lawrence Savell, Why Are They Picking on Us?, A.BA. J., Nov. 1992, at 72.
9. See, e.g., Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Liti-
gation, 52 FoPDHAm L. Rxv. 732, 770 (1984) ("[Glood epidemiologic evidence is
not only accepted by courts; in at least one case, it has been required."); Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989) (reversing
judgment on jury verdict because absence of "statistically significant epidemiolog-
ical proof that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects" rendered evidence
insufficient).
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enced lay persons but by a legal specialist. As a legal specialist, the
judge has assimilated a uniquely legal view, and thus applies a "legal
paradigm" of causation. In contrast to the jurors' single causal chain,
in the legal paradigm, the world is composed of realist "causal webs"
that give rise to legal liability when policy considerations of fairness
and responsibility indicate that liability is appropriate. Although the
legal and the folk paradigms contain significant differences from one
another, they share the common element of a realist concept of
causation.
Part III of this Article conducts a sociological examination of the
scientific community, concluding that a scientific causal claim does not
state a fact that is isomorphic with the structure of reality but is in-
stead merely a useful fiction. This sociological examination begins by
first surveying and ultimately rejecting the various traditional theo-
ries of scientific realism. The examination concludes by adopting an
anti-realist framework for analyzing science.
This anti-realist framework is then applied in Part III to reveal
several key concepts that illuminate the process through which scien-
tists produce "causal claims." This Article will show that scientists
demarcate specialties through boundary work, and that each segre-
gated specialty has a distinct hierarchy. One of the primary goals of
these specialized communities is the production of inscriptions, or
written records of research activities. Causal claims resulting from
this research are contingent upon one's acceptance of the community
conventions that give rise to those claims. Through successive incor-
poration of inscriptions, these socially constructed claims are eventu-
ally reified and posited as independently existing facts. This anti-
realist sociological account concludes that a scientific causal claim is a
socially constructed artefactlO that differs from the fact of causation
that is traditionally sought by the law.
Part IV examines the philosophical problems created by the use of
scientific evidence to prove legal causation and proposes a solution in
the form of a model jury instruction. The difficulties inherent to the
use of scientific evidence to prove legal causation revolve around the
fact that the causation sought by the fact finder is not necessarily con-
gruent with the causation about which the scientific expert testifies.
First, the scientist's causal paradigm is substantively different from
the realist causal paradigm of the law. Contrary to the traditional
view, scientific proof of causation, which reflects a consensus among
the relevant scientific community that given certain common assump-
tions, certain procedures have been followed with certain results, does
10. "Artefact" is a term used by social scientists to differentiate the products of
human creation (artefacts) from pre-existing products of nature (facts). BRUNo
LAToun & STEvE WooLGAIa LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF ScmNTIFic
FAcTs 174-77 (2d ed. 1986).
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not automatically resolve the issue of legal causation. Instead, scien-
tific concepts must be translated into legal concepts. Second, because
the scientific and legal communities are so segregated, the language
used to convey scientific concepts must be translated from the lan-
guage of the scientific community into that of the legal community.
Ignorance of these difficulties in translating the concepts and lan-
guage of scientific causal claims encourages the fact finder to assume
that scientific and legal causation are identical. In order to properly
assess the weight of scientific evidence, the jury must be instructed to
recognize the nature of scientific evidence and the difficulties involved
in its translation to a legally useful form.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
A. Law has adopted a realist "but for" test for cause-in-fact.
In order to recover, a tort plaintiff must prove not only that the
defendant acted tortiously, but also that the defendant's tortious con-
duct caused the plaintiff's injury.11 The inquiry into whether an al-
leged tortfeasor caused the plaintiff's injury is an attempt to
"determine whether the [tortfeasor] has... produced the harm... for
which he is sought to be held responsible... [so that] the law [will]
regard his conduct as the cause of the harm."12 This aspect of causa-
tion is termed "cause-in-fact."13 The traditional test for this type of
causation is the "but for' or sine qua non test.' 4 The but for test que-
ries whether the plaintiff's injury would have occurred had the de-
ll. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (1977). Although the rule is framed in
the context of negligence, it applies to strict liability and intentional torts as well.
Id. at cmt. e. The claimant need not be a plaintiff (e.g., the causation issue might
arise within the context of a counterclaim), however, for the sake of simplicity it
will be assumed that the claimant is a plaintiff.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Oh. 16 scope note (1963-64).
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264
(5th ed. 1984). The realist causal paradigm of the law is further confirmed by the
terminology used by lawyers to describe it. "Cause-in-fact" indicates an inquiry
into what actually happened. See id. Theorizing to "save the phenomena," which
is the common scientific practice, reflects a different set of concerns. See LOSEE,
supra note 5, at 43-50 (discussing debate over saving appearances during Coper-
nican Revolution).
14. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353,
1355 (1981). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 266; Ford v. Trident Fish-
eries Co., 122 N.E. 389 (Mass. 1919)(unavailability of lifeboat not but for cause of
death of drowning victim where victim could not have used lifeboat had it been
available); Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 54 N.W. 1091 (Wis. 1893)(absence of
fence surrounding hole in ice not but for cause of death of horses where fence
would not have stopped horses from falling into hole).
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fendant not acted.15 The test is satisfied, and the defendant's act is
the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, where the plaintiff's injury
does not occur in the absence of the defendant's act.i 6 Conversely, the
but for test is not satisfied, and there is no cause-in-fact, where the
plaintiff's injury would occur in the absence of the defendant's act.1 7
The "merging fires" cases illustrate the application of the but for
test of cause-in-fact. Merging fires cases involve some version of the
following facts: Two fires are set independently by A and B. These
fires merge and burn property belonging to C. Each fire would have
burned C's property in the absence of the other.iS In a merging fires
case, strict application of the but for test would preclude any recovery
by C, since neither fire is the but for cause of the damage to C's prop-
erty. Each fire would have independently burned C's property. Thus,
A's fire is not a but for cause of C's injury because C's property would
have burned in the absence of A's fire (as a result of B's fire). Simi-
larly, B's fire is not a but for cause of C's injury because C's property
would have burned in the absence of B's fire (as a result of A's fire).
Situations such as the merging fires cases, where two independent
causes are each sufficient to bring about an effect, may be called "joint
causation" situations. The effect of strict application of the but for test
to a joint causation situation is to force C to bear the loss notwith-
standing the fact that both defendants A and B may be negligent.
Faced with the inequity of this result in joint causation cases,' 9
courts began to formulate an alternative to the but for test. This alter-
native seeks to mitigate the harshness that would otherwise result
from applying the but for test in joint causation situations. In Ander-
son v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.,20 the
Minnesota Supreme Court introduced what has become known as the
"substantial factor" test for cause-in-fact. 2 ' Anderson involved a vari-
ation on the merging fires cases; the defendant railway allegedly
15. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 266. Formally, the test may be expressed as the
sentence: "If not-D, then not-P" (where D is the defendant's action and P is the
plaintiff's injury).
16. KEETON Er AL., supra note 12, at 266. See also, e.g., Hayes v. Michigan Central
R.R., 111 U.S. 228 (1884)(failure to fence in railroad tracks but for cause of child's
death due to collision with train). In this case, the sentence "If not-D, then not-p"
is true.
17. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 266. See also, e.g., Peterson v. Nielsen, 343 P.2d
731 (Utah 1959)(excessive speed not but for cause where accident would have
occurred at slower speed). In this case, the sentence "If not-D, then not-F' is
false, whereas the sentence "If not-D, then P" is true.
18. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 432 illus. 3 (1963-64).
19. KEETON FT AL., supra note 12, at 266-267. See also, e.g., Kingston v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
20. 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
21. Id. at 46.
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caused two fires, one in a bog near the plaintiff's property,2 2 and an-
other at nearby Kettle River.23 There was, in addition to these two
fires, a third fire of unknown origin in the vicinity.24 Anderson's prop-
erty burned,2 5 and he sued the railroad under a Minnesota strict lia-
bility statute26 for allegedly causing the fire which destroyed his
property. The only contested issue at trial was the issue of causa-
tion.2 7 The jury was instructed that the defendant railway would be
liable if the Kettle River fire merged with the fire of unknown origin
(for which the defendant was not responsible) before burning the
plaintiff's property, provided that the Kettle River fire remained a
"material or substantial factor" in causing the plaintiff's injury.28
This instruction gave rise to what has come to be known as the sub-
stantial factor test.
Since its initial formulation in Anderson, the substantial factor test
has been widely accepted. 2 9 Even under the substantial factor test,
however, biut for causation is still a requirement in all cases except
special joint causation cases, and it is in some respects required even
in joint causation cases.30 The substantial factor formulation is actu-
ally not a new test for causation, but a refinement in the traditional
but for test designed to accommodate the special category of joint cau-
sation cases.3S For this reason, although the predominant formula is
the "substantial factor" formula, the operative conceptual test contin-
ues to be the but for test. Although its precise contours differ slightly
in application depending upon the finder of fact, the but for test for
cause-in-fact elicits the application of a realist causal paradigm re-
gardless of whether the trier of fact is a judge or a jury.
B. Application of the but for test by a jury involves a realist
folk paradigm of causation.
Application of the but for test of cause-in-fact has traditionally
been largely left to the fact finder on the theory that ascertaining the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 47.
25. Id. at 46.
26. MiNN. STAT. § 4426 (1913); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179
N.W. 45, 48-49 (Minn. 1920).
27. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45, 46 (Minn. 1920).
28. Id.
29. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 267.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1963-64); King, Jr., supra note 14, at
1356. But for causation is required in joint causation cases because each cause
must in isolation be a but for cause of the plaintiff's injury. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
ON) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1963-64); King, Jr., supra note 14, at 1356. The joint
causes must also together be a but for cause of the plaintiff's injury. KEETON ET
AL., supra note 13, at 268.
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 267.
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presence or absence of cause-in-fact is a common sense endeavor con-
ducted as easily by a lay jury-person as by a judge. 32 This view of the
role of the fact finder rests upon the realist premise that causation is a
fact of life, and that assessment of its presence or absence requires no
special expertise. Thus conceived, application of the but for test by the
lay jury-person involves application of a realist folk paradigm of cau-
sation3 3 that views the relation between cause and effect as a mechan-
istic series of events that are links in a causal chain.34 A billiard shot
is a classic example of a causal chain. The cue ball strikes the 2-ball,
which then strikes the 3-ball, which in turn strikes the 6-ball, causing
the 6-ball to fall into the pocket. This series of events may be depicted
in the following form:
Cue
2
/ \
3 4
/ \ / \
5 67 8
32. Id. at 264-65.
33. AuDi, supra note 4, at 15-17; Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical
Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73
CoNELL L. Rlv. 469, 478-486 (1988). The view that reality conforms to one's
perceptions and thoughts which is "thought to represent untutored common
sense - has been called naive realism." AUDi, supra note 4, at 15-16.
Brennan uses slightly different terminology to make the same point.
Although he does not refer specifically to the jury, Brennan notes that the ap-
proach of the law to causation has largely resembled that of Newtonian physics,
which relied upon a Lockean epistemological framework that "postulated the
existence of fundamental particles in which inhered... 'primary qualities.'"
Brennan, supra note 33, at 478. See also 5 FREDERICK COPLEsTON, A HISTORY OF
PHILosoPHY 86-90 (Image ed. 1985)(discussing Locke's theory of primary and sec-
ondary qualities); LOSEE, supra note 4, at 97-98 (discussing Locke's atomism and
vacillating skepticism). Causation, although a relation between ideas, had as its
basis "the power to be a cause" which was one of these primary qualities which
existed "out there" in the world. Id. at 96-98 (discussing Locke's views of
causation).
34. Brennan, supra note 33, at 486.
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According to the realist folk paradigm, this causal chain is not
merely the player's mental construction, 35 it is actually out there on
the table. The 2-3-6 causal sequence (i.e., the lines connecting the 2-
ball, 3-ball and 6-ball in the above diagram) is as real as are the balls
themselves. The causal chains are not merely heuristic devices or con-
ceptual models that explain observations; rather, they are real compo-
nents of the external world. Causal chains are, in essence, part of the
"furniture of the universe."
When applying this realist paradigm of causation, the task of the
jury is to look out into the world to see if the plaintiff's injury and the
defendant's action are both links in a single casual chain. The jury
begins with the plaintiff's injury, then identifies the correct causal
chain and traces it backwards through time to ascertain whether the
defendant's action is a link in that same chain. This task is akin to
identifying the 6-ball, and then tracing the causal sequence back-
wards through the actions and reactions of the 3-ball and the 2-ball, to
see if the cue ball caused the 6-ball to sink.
The distinctive feature of the folk paradigm of causation is that
when the causal chain is traced backwards through time, only one
choice is possible at each link. For example, when tracing the causal
chain backwards from the 6-ball, the only possible choice at the first
link in the causal chain is the 3-ball. Similarly, when looking back-
wards from the 3-ball, the 2-ball is the only potential choice for the
next link in the causal chain. If the defendant's action is not one of the
links in the chain of causation leading to the plaintiff's injury, the
causal inquiry is at an end. If, however, the defendant's actions are a
link in the appropriate causal chain, liability attaches.
The sole exception to this result is in cases in which the defend-
ant's actions are temporally too distant, so that proximate cause is not
present. Acts or events that terminate liability by interrupting the
causal chain are "superseding"36 or "intervening"37 causes that serve
to link the plaintiff's injury to another causal chain for which the de-
fendant is not responsible. By tracing the causal chain backwards
through time, the jury discovers a single causal series to the exclusion
of all other possible causal series. Thus, under this folk conception of
causal analysis, an effect is traced along a single chain of causation
through a series of causes, all of which have a real external presence.
35. If pressed, most epistemological realists would maintain that although causation
may be to some extent a mental construct, this construct has its origin in certain
relations between external events. See supra note 33 (discussing Locke's similar
approach).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1963-64)(defining superseding
cause).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1963-64)(defining intervening
cause).
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In sum, the jury discovers causality, it does not create it. Pre-existing
causes and effects are simply part of the external world.
C. Application of the but for test by a judge involves a
realist legal paradigm of causation.
Although initially appealing, the folk paradigm of causation ulti-
mately proves unsatisfactory. Upon reflection, it should become ap-
parent that an event, such as a plaintiff's injury, is generally not the
result of a single chain of causes. Instead, an event is likely to be the
result of the convergence of several causal chains, as illustrated
below:38
12 -- Cue - 13
\ / \
11 \
/I\ / \
10 2 9
3 4/ \ / \
5 67 8
In this regard, it might be more appropriate to talk of webs, rather
than chains, of causation. An event, such as the action of the 6-ball, is
more properly seen as the result of the intersection of numerous
causal strands, rather than as the result of a single chain of causation.
When the causal sequence giving rise to the motion of the 6-ball is
traced backwards through time, it is likely that several balls acted in
conjunction to cause the 6-ball to sink. Thus, when looking back-
wards, one may identify several simultaneous causes, rather than an
individual link in a single-stranded causal chain. For example, the
action of the 3-ball is not due solely to the action of the 2-ball but is
also related to the action of the 10-ball. The action of each of these
balls, in turn, is caused by one or more other balls. When a jury traces
causation along a causal chain, the number of causes increases arith-
metically as additional links are added one by one. However, causal
webs may increase the number of causes geometrically as increasing
numbers of strands are encountered.
38. Brennan, supra note 33, at 485.
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Viewed in this way, causal analysis ceases to serve as the common
sense limitation that it was under the jurors' causal chain approach.
While identification of an isolated causal chain would exclude the nu-
merous other possible chains, recognition that these chains might be
interdependent rather than mutually exclusive removes much of the
value of cause-in-fact as a device of exclusion. In the case of the 6-ball
in Illustration 2, only five of the thirteen balls (i.e., the 4, 7, 8, 9 and
13-balls) are excluded from the causal web. Thus, while cause-in-fact
remains a useful device to eliminate those few cases in which it is
wholly absent,3 9 it is still in need of some other limitation. Without
an additional limitation, the scope of liability is potentially unlimited.
Thus, in order to limit the scope of liability under the legal paradigm
of causation, potentially infinite real causal webs are restricted by de-
liberate choices of legal policy as to how far liability should be ex-
tended.40 These choices are made under the rubric of proximate
cause.
The wedding of policy-based proximate cause to realist causal webs
(cause-in-fact) creates a new legal causal paradigm.41 Judges do not
deal with the folk paradigm of causation; rather, they apply a
uniquely legal paradigm of causation.4 2 This legal paradigm involves
a different view of reality and a series of choices about individual re-
sponsibility and societal functioning.43 Under the legal paradigm of
causation, interrelated causal webs, rather than simple mutually ex-
clusive causal chains, are seen as having independent externalized
existence. A single effect such as a plaintiff's injury may be the result
of numerous causes along various strands of the web. Because this
concept of causation generates too many causes to be a useful limit,
policy-based limitations are used to exclude "distant" causes.44
Although the content of the precise policies underlying the policy-
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 266.
40. Id. at 273; Brennan, supra note 33, at 484.
41. Brennan, supra note 33, at 484. The specialization of the legal concept of causa-
tion becomes even more pronounced when the substantial factor test of causation
is used, due to the ambiguity of the test. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 41, at 43 (Supp. 1988)(listing four different us-
ages of substantial factor test).
Although jurors also apply proximate cause, the common sense conception of
this test equates proximate cause with some intuitively limited number of imme-
diately preceding causes in the causal chain. This "temporal limit" which ex-
cludes "distant" causes is the same when applied by the judge. However, the
judge also applies a new type of analysis in evaluating proximate cause. The
judge also performs policy analysis in order to "prune the causal tree" in accord-
ance with policy concerns. This policy element is absent from the jury's concept of
causation.
42. Brennan, supra note 33, at 484.
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id. at 484.
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based limitations may vary, the basic structure of the formula re-
mains constant.
The substantive policies underlying policy-based limitations on
causation have been extensively analyzed by proponents of the Law
and Economics movement. A brief sketch of two influential proposals
indicates that although the substance of the policy may vary, the legal
paradigm of causation relies on a policy-based limit to exclude certain
real causes from creating liability. For example, Guido Calabresi
views the policy basis for limiting causation as a species of economic
efficiency. 45 According to Calabresi, causation is a doctrine that
serves to further the goals of the tort system.46 The goals of tort law
are wealth distribution (compensation) and minimization of inefficient
actions through deterrence.47 As if to reinforce this point, Calabresi
terms his analysis of the legal doctrine of causation a "functional anal-
ysis."48 For Calabresi, certain causes are selected from the overabun-
dance of causes-in-fact and are recognized under the legal rubric of
proximate cause. The criterion for selecting causes for recognition is
whether such recognition furthers the goals of wealth maximization
and efficiency. Thus, Calabresi espouses a policy-based limit on cau-
sation. Richard Epstein adopts a similar view, but perceives the goal
of tort law as more normative. According to Epstein, tort law is
designed to protect individual spheres of autonomy by providing re-
dress for encroachment upon a plaintiff's sphere of autonomy by
others.49 Various real causes are selected from the web as is dictated
by this normative view; one is liable for damage for which one should
be held responsible. Although Calabresi and Epstein posit different
substantive policies as the guiding policy behind proximate cause,
they agree that cause-in-fact is limited by a doctrine of proximate
cause that incorporates policy concerns into the causal calculus. On
either theory, the ultimate causal analysis consists of an investigation
into "real causal webs" that is truncated by the relevant policy con-
cerns of efficiency or morality.
The basic realist paradigm of causal analysis used by both judge
and jury has proven to possess remarkable staying power. It has en-
dured despite the increasing complexity of factual situations encoun-
tered by the courts. This basic framework requires the plaintiff to
prove the existence of a realist cause-in-fact. The precise contours of
the plaintiff's burden will depend upon the trier of fact, but they al-
45. John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STun. 419, 424 (1979);
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry
Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 69-70 (1975).
46. Borgo, supra note 45, at 424; Calabresi, supra note 45, at 74-77.
47. Brennan, supra note 33, at 486-89; Calabresi, supra note 45, at 69-70.
48. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 70.
49. Brennan, supra note 33, at 488; Borgo, supra note 45, at 419-420; Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
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ways remain realist. If the trier of fact is a jury, the jury instructions
will elicit application of a realist folk paradigm of causation. If the
trier of fact is a judge, the operative legal paradigm will be rather dif-
ferent and will involve policy-based limitations upon realist webs of
causes-in-fact. Both paradigms are thoroughly realist in that they
seek to ascertain pre-existing states of affairs in the external world.
Accordingly, the legal concept of cause-in-fact, whether in the form of
the folk or the legal paradigm, is one that differs significantly from the
causal accounts generated by science.
III. THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
A. Realist accounts of the scientific enterprise prove
inadequate.
Scientists conduct experimental research in order to advance their
field by tracing out the implications of the theories with which they
work. When, on the basis of such research, a scientist claims to have
proven the existence of a causal relationship, that scientist makes a
"causal claim." Exactly what do such causal claims mean? What
weight should be given to causal claims derived from experimental re-
search? The status of scientific claims derived from experimental re-
search is a subject of immense debate, the history of which is largely a
tale of three theories: the Positivist theory of verificationism,5O the
Popperian theory of falsificationism, and anti-realist theory.51
Some version of the Positivist theory of verificationism has domi-
nated the philosophical landscape since the Copernican Revolution
signalled the rise of the modern science it purports to explain.52
Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems appeared
in 1632,53 and later that same year Galileo was called before the Pa-
pal Inquisition for transgressing the infamous Injunction of 1616.54
Almost simultaneously, Sir Francis Bacon attempted the first compre-
hensive treatment of the "new" scientific method in his Novum Orga-
num, which appeared in 1620.55 Bacon's treatise, the first philosophy
of science text specifically to address the methodology of modern sci-
50. Verificationism is used here in a broader sense than the more technical meaning
ascribed to it by the members of the Vienna Circle. See WILLA BECHTEL, PM-
LOSoPHY OF SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 19 (1988)(discussing
verification theory of meaning held by members of Vienna Circle). For an in-
structive and accessible account of this broader verificationism, see J.P. MORE-
LAND, CHRIsnANr AND THE NATuRE OF SCIENCE 86-92 (1989).
51. Anti-realism is actually not a single theory, but a group of related theories which
deny the central realist premise. See infra note 74.
52. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HIsTORY OF WESTERN PmosoPHY 525-40 (1972).
53. GIORGIO DR SANTILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO 198 (1962).
54. Id. at 226.
55. LOSEE, supra note 5, at 60-69; RUSSELL, supra note 52, at 541-45.
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ence, introduced the inductive method which later culminated in the
Positivist theory.56 Bacon's inductive method was further developed
by John Stuart Mi11,57 who introduced the seeds of verificationist the-
ory in the form of a "verified hypothesis."58
From these early formulations, the belief that observation provides
evidence that verifies the truth of the tested hypothesis grew until it
became the received orthodoxy of the philosophy of science 59 and was
incorporated into law. Under the mature verificationist theory of Karl
Hempel, scientific hypotheses are thought to be "confirmed" by experi-
mentation. Although a favorable experimental result does not "afford
complete proof of the hypothesis, it provides at least some support,
some partial corroboration or confirmation for it."60 It follows that in-
creasing amounts of experimental confirmation provide increasing evi-
dential support for the hypothesis.61 Thus, although a hypothesis will
never be 100% verified, experimentation provides direct support for a
hypothesis, such as a causal claim, by providing direct supporting evi-
dence for the truth of the hypothesis.62
Thus, under a verificationist theory, scientific and legal paradigms
of causation are virtually identical: both concepts of causation are re-
alist and purport to find externalized causes in the world of nature.
For the verificationist, a hypothesis that A causes B63 is proven to be
56. DONALD GILLIES, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FOUR CEN-
TRAL THE zs 3-5 (1993).
57. LOSEE, supra note 5, at 148-58.
58. Id. at 153-54.
59. RICHARD W. MILLER, FACT AND METHOD: EXPLANATION, CONFIniATiON AND REAL-
rr IN THE NATURAL AND THE SOC1aL. SCIENCES 3 (1987). See MORELAND, supra
note 50, at 86.
60. CARL G. HEMPEL, PHiLOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 8 (1966). See also Janet
Kourany, The Validation of Scientific Knowledge, in SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: BA-
sic IssuEs IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 112, 114 (1987) [hereinafter Kourany
II].
61. HEMPEL, supra note 60, at 33.
62. MORELAND, supra note 50, at 87.
63. A causal claim is actually a complex judgment (or explanation) based upon the
justification of several related hypotheses rather than a single simple hypothesis.
Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Disease: A Chronological Journey, 108 Aia. J.
EPID. 249, 254 (1978) [hereinafter Evans I]; Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Dis-
ease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALE J. Bio. & MED. 175, 175, 191-
192 (1976) [hereinafter Evans II]. See also, e.g., Lilienfeld, supra note 6, at 838
(defending judgment that smoking causes cancer). However, although a causal
claim is a complex judgment, the justification of that judgment is dependent upon
the status of the individual hypotheses that the judgment purports to explain.
Thus, although it is an oversimplification, it is useful to think of the causal claim
as a single hypothesis.
In actuality, experiments will normally be formulated as attempts to disprove
a "null hypothesis" rather than as attempts to confirm a causal hypothesis.
CLAIRE SELTIm ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS, reprinted in
JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
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true (or at least very probably true) when the results predicted by that
hypothesis are observed.64 However, despite the continuing influence
of verificationism among scientists and jurists, philosophers of science
have abandoned it because of its serious deficiencies as an explanation
of the scientific endeavor. 65
A second theory that seeks to explain the theoretical products of
empirical observation is Karl Popper's theory of falsificationism. Pop-
per advocates a view in which "conjectures," 66 or unjustified guesses,
serve to generate hypotheses that are then subjected to empirical test-
ing. While the discovery of such conjectures is not subject to justifica-
tion, 67 the hypotheses derived from the conjectures are subject to
testing and justification.68 This testing takes the form, not of confir-
mation as the Positivists believed, but of falsification.69 According to
Popper, scientific knowledge is always contingent because in order to
be scientific, it must be subject to falsification.70
In the eyes of a falsificationist, scientific and legal causal inquiries
are similar. A causal hypothesis, although always contingent and
subject to disproof, is shown to be possibly true when the predicted
results are observed.71 Although science can only demonstrate that a
ALs 74, 75 (3rd ed. 1994). Thus, individual hypotheses are often justified by the
disconfirmation of their negation (i.e., the null hypothesis). This view of experi-
mentation reflects the influence of falsificationism, but may easily be adapted to
verificationism by discarding the use of the null hypothesis and testing the "true"
hypothesis directly.
64. Kourany I, supra note 4, at 336-37.
65. MILLER, supra note 59, at 3; MORELAND, supra note 50, at 87. Although discus-
sion of the merits of verificationism is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
mention of a few of the criticisms levelled against verificationism will illustrate
the debate. For example, disputes over competing hypotheses have, throughout
the history of science, been resolved not by counting up confirmatory instances,
but by a complex process of evaluation, of which counting confirmatory instances
is merely a part. Id. at 87-88. Second, the "raven paradox" undermines the no-
tion of confirmation, as Hempel himself noted. The hypothesis that "All ravens
are black" is logically equivalent to the contrapositive "All non-black things are
non-ravens." Thus, on the verificationist view one may confirm the hypothesis as
easily by observing white tennis shoes as by observing black ravens. Id. at 88-89.
Third, as Popper points out, scientists do not record all facts; they are selective.
This selectivity requires a theory, so that no observation is ever conducted with-
out some theoretical background. Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refuta-
tions, in SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 139, 146-50 (Janet Kourany ed., 1987). See
GmLixs, supra note 56, at 26-29. Finally, no number of individual observations
(e.g, observations that certain ravens are black) will confirm the general hypothe-
sis that all ravens are black, or even the more limited hypothesis that the next
raven will be black. Popper, supra at 145-46.
66. GILEs, supra note 56, at 32.
67. Sm KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SciENTIFc DISCOVERY 31-32 (2d ed. 1968).
68. Id. at 31.
69. Id. at 40-41.
70. Id.
71. Kourany II, supra note 60, at 114-15.
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causal relationship possibly exists, a demonstration of possible truth
is a demonstration about the state of the external world,72 and thus
mirrors the type of causal inquiry in which the law engages.
However, falsificationism has serious problems too, not the least of
which is that data virtually never will bear on a single falsifiable hy-
pothesis. 73 For this and other reasons, falsificationism is also an in-
sufficient account of the relation between scientific activities and the
resulting scientific theories. Because neither version of realism has
provided an adequate description of the relation between the scientific
enterprise and the theories it generates, one must turn to the alterna-
tive theories provided by the anti-realists.
B. Anti-realism provides a more accurate account of the
scientific enterprise.
The anti-realist theory of the scientific method is actually a cluster
of loosely related theories denominated by various names such as con-
ventionalism, instrumentalism and pragmatism. 74 The common the-
sis of these various anti-realist theories is that, in contrast to the
postulates of realist theories, observation has little if anything to do
with the truth or falsity of a causal hypothesis. The fact that the re-
sults predicted by a causal hypothesis are observed means only that
the hypothesis provides a useful model for explaining the phenomena
observed. A successful scientific model is one that continues to ac-
count for the observed phenomena. However, "saving the phenomena"
may occur irrespective of the "truth" of the model, or in other words,
regardless of whether the model reflects the real state of the external
world. For example, Ptolemaic astronomy and phlogiston theory in
chemistry both "saved" their relevant phenomena until a sufficient
number of anomalies finally rendered the theories untenable.75
Notwithstanding the early success of these theories, no one today con-
tends that they are true of reality. This same reasoning applies to the
theories that replaced them, and indeed, to all scientific models.
Although the concerns of the anti-realist become more persuasive
as scientific models become increasingly abstract, the agnosticism of
the anti-realist is not limited solely to the general theoretical level or
72. Id.
73. This criticism is known as the "Duhem-Quine Thesis." GIL.Es, supra note 56, at
205, 210-14. See also MoRELAND, supra note 50, at 85. For additional criticisms
see id. at 85-86.
74. Kourany II, supra note 60, at 115-19 (discussing conventionalism of Pierre
Duhem, "methodology of scientific research programmes" of Imre Lakatos and
sociological approach of Thomas Kuhn); MoRELAND, supra note 50, at 83, 172-202
(discussing conventionalism, pragmatism, instrumentalism, phenomenalism, op-
erationalism, constructive empiricism, and Kuhn's sociological approach).
75. See KuHN, supra note 3, at 68-72 (discussing Copernican and chemical revolu-
tions as examples of paradigm changes).
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to explanations of observed phenomena. To varying degrees, the anti-
realist's skepticism extends to the observations themselves.76 In sum,
anti-realists view science as a process through which scientific "facts"
are socially constructed, rather than constituting a direct reflection of
natural phenomena.7 7 Traditional realists believed the scientific com-
munity to be a group of neutral and objective observers that would,
absent some distortion, achieve knowledge that is "increasingly iso-
morphic to the structure of reality,"7T but the anti-realists insist that
science is a much more socially-oriented endeavor through which the
external world "operates through the meanings created by scientists
in their attempts to interpret that world."79 Once the realist myth of
the objective scientist who merely mirrors nature is rejected, "there is
no alternative but to regard the [theoretical] products of science as
social constructions like all other cultural products.8o
Rejection of the realist philosophies of science reveals the problems
created by the use of scientific evidence to prove legal causation. As
long as scientists and lawyers were both thought to be engaged in as-
certaining the truth about reality, scientific assessments of causation
that were purportedly isomorphic to the structure of reality could be
assumed to be directly relevant to the legal inquiry into that same
reality.S1 However, once science is viewed as a theory-building enter-
prise that is detached from reality, it becomes necessary to question
the relevance of the products of this process to the distinct causal in-
quiry embodied in the law. Because the nature of the scientific pro-
cess defines the contours of the difference between causation in the
eyes of science and law, one must begin by carefully examining the
nature of science on the anti-realist theory.
One of the most influential anti-realist theorists is Thomas Kuhn.
According to Kuhn, the history of science is divided into periods of
76. Different anti-realists would press this point to different degrees. Some anti-real-
ists argue that even the most basic and apparently purely observational fact, for
example, the observation of a virus through an electron microscope, is affected by
the scientific paradigm. While this is probably correct, such an all encompassing
anti-realism is unnecessary to raise questions about causal judgments because
causal judgments are not purely observational, but contain a large theoretical
component. See supra note 6.
77. See, e.g., LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 236-344; MICHAEL J. MULIAY,
SCIENCE AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 60-61 (1979).
78. MuLxAy, supra note 77, at 62-63.
79. Id. at 61.
80. Id.
81. From a philosophical point of view, this assumption is not altogether un-
problematic even on the realist thesis, for it assumes that the relation between
causality in science, law and nature is transitive. Moreover, even if precisely the
same concepts are employed by the legal and scientific paradigms, the linguistic
reference difficulties in translation remain. Of course, if the concepts employed
by scientists and lawyers match up exactly, it would very likely be harmless error
to ignore any uncertainty introduced in the process of translation.
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"normal science"8 2 and periods of "revolutionary science."8 3 Most of
the history of science consists of normal science, which is essentially a
series of "mopping up operations" that are directed toward articulat-
ing an accepted paradigm and the phenomena that it predicts.8 4 Be-
cause normal science consists mostly of attempts to fill in the holes of
a paradigm by extending its scope and increasing its precision, normal
science is exceedingly cumulative and progressive. Normal science
also involves "puzzle-solving," which is an activity through which phe-
nomena that resist explanation under the accepted paradigm are
gradually incorporated into that paradigm.8 5
However, as the scope of the accepted paradigm is expanded, more
and more puzzles will resist solution under that paradigm.8 6 Thus,
expansion of the accepted paradigm causes "anomalies" to accumu-
late.8 7 When the accumulation of anomalies becomes sufficiently seri-
ous, scientists begin to feel insecure with the old paradigm, and
alternative paradigms start to form.88 This event signals a period of
crisis. A period of revolutionary science is born when a viable competi-
tor to the established paradigm emerges.8 9 The revolution concludes
with the adoption of a new paradigm.90 Throughout this enterprise,
social relations are central. A new paradigm is adopted not because it
is true, but because "its opponents eventually die, and a new genera-
tion grows up that is familiar with it."91
In his 1969 Postscript, Kuhn resolved ambiguities in his earlier
work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by making extensive ref-
erence to the structure of the scientific community.92 The resulting
82. KUHN, supra note 3, at 10. See also id. at 10-42 (discussing the role of normal
science). Kuhn defines normal science as "research firmly based upon one or
more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further
practice." Id. at 10.
83. Id. at 92-135 (discussing nature of scientific revolutions). Kuhn defines revolu-
tionary science as "non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older par-
adigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one." Id. at 92.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 35-42. These puzzles for which solutions are sought have generally ex-
pected solutions and rules governing both the range of acceptable solutions and
procedures which may be used to reach a solution. Id. at 38.
86. Id. at 52.
87. Id. at 52-53.
88. Id. at 67-68. Not every accumulation of anomalies precipitates a full fledged cri-
sis. Rather, the accumulation of anomalies generally must interact with prevail-
ing circumstances in order to make resolution of the accumulated problems
particularly urgent. Id. at 81-83.
89. Id. at 77.
90. Id. at 90-91.
91. Id. at 151 (quoting MAx PLANmc, ScIEN ic AuTOBIoGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS
33-39 (F. Gaynor trans., 1949)). See also id. at 90.
92. Although influential, Kuhn's theory has not escaped criticism, especially at
points upon which the theory is ambiguous. See MORELAND, supra note 50, at
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anti-realist theory has provided a framework (or paradigm) within
which sociologists of science have sought to understand the actual
workings of the scientific community. 93 Kuhn's anti-realist view of
science provided the impetus for investigation into the sociology of sci-
entific knowledge, and as this sociological research has progressed,94 a
more precise account of the social construction of scientific facts has
emerged. This account features five prominent concepts. Integration
of these five concepts produces a more detailed variation of Kuhn's
theory, under which scientists manufacture causal claims in a manner
that is essentially unconcerned with the "real causes" sought by the
law.
C. An anti-realist sociology of science consists of five
elements.
1. Scientists establish communities through "boundary work."
The first element of the sociological account of the construction of
scientific facts is the concept of "boundary work." Researchers use
boundary work to self-define their community and maintain consen-
sus among the members of that community. The resulting communi-
ties consist of relatively small, homogenous and well-defined groups of
scientific specialists. These communities preserve a series of "negoti-
ated agreements within a research community about a host of issues
ranging from the applicable theoretical paradigm[9 5] to the norms of
peer review and publication."96 In order to achieve such a high degree
of consensus, scientific disciplines become differentiated in a manner
such that the members of any particular discipline share a culture and
198-202 (making such criticisms of Kuhn's theory). As Kuhn's theories have been
critiqued and developed by others, minor modifications and refinements have
been added. See, e.g., Michael J. Mulkay, Conformity and Innovation in Science,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 5, 19 (Paul Halmos ed., 1972)(proposing five types
of innovation instead of two).
93. Kuhn's theory need not be reified in order for the observations generated by it to
be instructive. If some modification of Kuhn's theory is reified, then scientists are
in fact not describing reality. If the theory is not reified, an agnostic position is
taken as to whether scientists do in fact describe reality. The non-reified theory
is merely one way (perhaps the most coherent way) to view the activities of scien-
tists. See Charles M. Kester, Note, Is There a Person in That Body: An Argument
for the Priority of Persons and the Need for a New Legal Paradigm, 82 GEO. L.J.
1643 n.166 (1993)(discussing reification in context of personal identity and phi-
losophy-law interface).
94. We remain largely ignorant in the area of sociology of science, despite the impor-
tance of science to modern society. STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN
NATURE AND SOCIETY 1 (1992); LAToUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 17.
95. See MARLAN BLISSETr, POLITICS IN SCIENCE 93 (1972).
96. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77
JUDicATURE 77, 78 (1993-94)(footnote added).
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a mythology. 97 The existence of shared myths serves as the defining
feature of a disciplinary group.98
This mythology is not limited to the substance of scientific theories
but also consists of histories and biographies.99 These elements assist
the community members to integrate their unique scientific paradigm
into their broader set of beliefs. Furthermore, a shared mythology em-
bodies the consensus necessary for effective researchlOO and provides
an important component of a "symbolic universe" that enables an indi-
vidual to locate herself in reality and to give meaning to her exper-
iences.101 The boundaries separating the community that shares
these myths from "outsiders" who do not share them are reinforced
both through formal channels of communication such as published ar-
ticles in peer reviewed journals102 and through informal means of
communication, such as the "invisible college."103
The concept of community self-definition through boundary work is
important because it explains the reactions of scientists to unfavora-
ble facts and experimental results. Proponents of aberrant results
may be "converted" from their wayward views through "therapy,"104
thereby permitting them to remain within the research community
without creating cognitive dissonance for the other community mem-
bers.1O5 Alternatively, members might seek to preserve the commu-
nity by subjecting non-conformists to "nihilation.106 Nihilation is a
process that marginalizes aberrant views by assigning deviants to an
inferior professional or social status in order to relegate their observa-
tions to an inferior ontological status.1 O7
Aberrant members of the research group may be nihilated through
either of two mechanisms. First, non-compliant members may be
nihilated through reclassification as non-members of the relevant
community. Thus, the disciplinary insiders classify the proponents of
97. LATOUR & WOOLGA?, supra note 10, at 54-55.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 54.
100. BLiSSETr, supra note 95, at 93.
101. PETER L. BERGER & ThoiIAS LucairsN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE I Tm SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 96 (1966).
102. LATOUR & WooLGAR, supra note 10, at 52-53.
103. DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES: DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCmNTIFIC COM-
u=r irS 12 (1975). An invisible college is a group of scientists involved in vari-
ous fields of research who interact for the purpose of providing each other with
information that is necessary to conduct their respective research projects in such
a manner as to prevent the delay of their research efforts that would result if the
only source of this information were peer review journals. J. Gaston, Communi-
cation and the Reward System of Science: A Study of a National "Invisible Col-
lege", in TiE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 25 (Paul Halmos ed., 1972).
104. BERGER & LucKEmAN, supra note 101, at 104.
105. Id. at 104-05.
106. Id. at 105-06.
107. Id. at 106.
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aberrant views as members of a different discipline (or as non-scien-
tists altogether) in order to safely discount their proposals. A second
means of nihilation is characterizing the aberrant community member
as a rebellious iconoclast.1OS In such cases, although the non-conform-
ist remains a member of the community, aberrant behavior is dis-
missed as unimportant because it is to be expected from "someone like
that." Through this careful use of boundary work, the members of a
disciplinary group effectively insulate themselves from criticism, 10 9
are able to perpetuate the accepted paradigm, and are able to mini-
mize recognition of the contingencies of their findings.
2. Scientific communities have rigid hierarchical structures.
A second major element of an account of the social construction of
science is "hierarchy." Hierarchy affects the credibility and influence
of members of the disciplinary group. The maintenance of the para-
digm and mythology of the scientific discipline through nihilation and
therapy is greatly simplified by the existence of a hierarchical struc-
ture. The hierarchical position of a scientist essentially determines
her credibility with other members of the disciplinello and allows one
to talk about the "right" result or measurement.Ili
Credibility is significant for two reasons. First, the credibility of
the experimenter influences the results that will be accepted as the
"right" results in an experiment that is likely never to be repli-
cated. 1 2 Therefore, acceptance of the results of an experiment may
ultimately be based upon the invocation of the experimenter's position
in the hierarchy. This position is likely to be a function of the time
and energy one has invested in the established paradigm, and thus
promotes a highly conservative interpretation of data.3
Relatedly, the second reason for the importance of credibility is due
to "experimenters' regress.""l4 Even when replication is attempted, a
second experiment can never be an exact replication of the previous
experiment. Failure to replicate the results of the first experiment
may always be blamed on a failure in the second experiment. More-
over, even if the experiments were identical, variant results are al-
ways subject to ad hoc explanations or outright dismissal.115 In cases
108. See, e.g., id. at 115; Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78 (citing Thomas F. Gieryn,
Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non.Science: Strains and
Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. Soc. Rlv. 781 (1983)).
109. Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78.
110. LATouR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 213.
111. Id. at 239.
112. COLE, supra note 94, at 12-14.
113. See generally Ku-N, supra note 3, at 151-52 (arguing that older scientists resist
paradigm shifts in part due to investments in old paradigm).
114. Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78.
115. See id.; Kuru, supra note 3, at 73-83.
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such as these, credibility provides a criterion that facilitates selection
among varying results.
A scientist's position also affects her influence. Influence is the
ability of the occupant of a higher social position to impose costs upon
those scientists occupying lower positions. A more influential scientist
may seek to perpetuate an established paradigm by imposing costs
upon deviants, thereby discouraging deviant behavior.116
This imposition of costs occurs in two ways. First, the influential
scientist may impose costs to the conceptual commitments of devi-
ants.117 For instance, a senior scientist may use equipment or proce-
dures that are more firmly grounded in the accepted paradigm, so that
her results are more intimately tied up with the paradigm. Thus, any
questioning of her results would call a substantially larger number of
components of the established paradigm into question. This in turn
creates a greater level of cognitive dissonance for the deviant, and is
therefore more costly.
A second method of imposing discouraging costs upon deviants is
for the more influential scientist to use her influence over the personal
careers of deviants.118 Thus, the senior scientist might exert raw
political power over the future careers of subordinates by threatening,
either implicitly or explicitly, to give poor recommendations to an un-
cooperative subordinate. Empirical research has demonstrated the
existence and exploitation of extensive hierarchical structures among
self-defined scientific communities.119
3. Scientific communities exist to produce inscriptions.
The third element of a sociological account of the social construc-
tion of a scientific fact is the concept of "inscription." The results of
modern science frequently take the form of numbers, charts and
graphs.120 The generation of such inscriptions is one of the primary
purposes of experimental science.121 Inscriptions are important be-
cause they are one vehicle through which "reification122 occurs. By
progressive evolution through the literature and incorporation into
later dependent inscriptions, the modalities123 of a statement such as
116. BLISSETr, supra note 95, at 93; BERGER & Lucniaitx, supra note 101, at 104-05.
117. LATOUR & WooLGAR, supra note 10, at 241-42.
118. BERGER & Luco'iAN, supra note 101, at 114-15.
119. See BLIsSErr, supra note 95, at 107-26.
120. Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78.
121. LAToUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 51-52.
122. For a discussion of the concept of reification, see infra subsection III.C.5.
123. Modalities are syntactic qualifiers revealing the contingencies of the statements
to which the qualifiers are attached. LATOUR & WooLGAR, supra note 10, at 77
(footnote omitted).
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a causal claim are removed, and the statement begins to appear more
fact-like.124
Inscriptions also encourage reification in a second way. Inscrip-
tions are the major export of the scientific community, and in packag-
ing their wares for export, scientists transform them. Visual
depictions of phenomena that are used by members of the active scien-
tific community are generally abstract and highly schematic, seeking
merely to serve as a shorthand signifier for the phenomena signi-
fied. 125 These depictions are not realistic because there is no need to
convince members of the community to accept the underlying theory
since they already share a paradigm. In contrast to the "theoretical"
depiction found in peer reviewed journals, however, introductory text-
books and popular disseminations contain highly realistic depictions
of these same phenomena.12 6 These realistic depictions encourage
outsiders to associate the drawings with objects in nature. This asso-
ciation results in reification when the depictions are no longer viewed
as explications of a theory but as depictions of reality. In other words,
the theory sheds its contingency and theoretical postulates become ob-
jects of nature.
4. The products of scientific communities are contingent upon
communal commitments.
The fourth main element in an account of the social construction of
a scientific fact is contingency. "[Slientific claims are never absolutely
true, but are always contingent on such factors as the experimental or
interpretive conventions that have been agreed to within the relevant
scientific communities."12 7 One useful model for explaining this con-
tingency is provided by sociologists Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar,
who utilize the concept of an "agonistic field."128 If scientists are en-
gaged in the construction of scientific facts through operations
designed to gradually eliminate the modalities from accounts of those
facts, it follows that the activities of the scientist are not directed
solely toward nature but are also directed toward these modality-re-
ducing operations. The agonistic field consists of all these modality-
reducing operations. 129
The key to creating a scientific fact is to distinguish a single fact-
statement from the "background noise" created by the existence of
124. Id. at 69. For a detailed model of the process through which these modalities are
dropped, see infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
125. See G. NIGEL GILBERT & MICHAEL J. MULKAY, OPENING PANDoRAS Box: A Socio-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIsTs' DisCoURSE 141-48 (1984).
126. Id. at 141-43.
127. Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78.
128. LATouR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 237.
129. Id.
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other potential fact-statements within the community.130 If the ago-
nistic field within the community contains several equally probable
statements, the purported fact-statement will not achieve fact-like
status because it will be indistinguishable from the background
noise.13 1 If, however, the purported fact-statement may be differenti-
ated from its competitors, it has begun the journey toward fact status.
It matters not how this journey commences; whether through intimi-
dation of inferiors or inherent theoretical plausibility, the result is the
same.132
The contingency of many commonly accepted scientific facts may
be demonstrated through deconstruction of those facts.133 Decon-
struction of scientific discourse reveals that scientists employ several
types of discourse, or repertoires. Normal scientific discourse is domi-
nated by an "empiricist repertoire" that ignores the contingencies in-
volved in the social construction of scientific facts. The empiricist
repertoire prefers to describe the actions and beliefs of scientists as if
they "follow[ed] unproblematically and inescapably from the empirical
characteristics of an impersonal natural world."134 Use of this empiri-
cist repertoire minimizes any reference to the author of the causal
claim, presenting her solely as a research tool with no discretionary
participation in the experiment.1s5 Equally probable alternative ex-
planations within the agonistic field are omitted from the empiricist
account of the experiment.136
In contrast to the empiricist repertoire that dominates formal com-
munication, scientists also employ a "contingent repertoire" that
reveals contingent elements of experiments that are normally ob-
scured by the empiricist repertoire.13 7 The contingent repertoire is
often employed to explain and minimize inconsistent experimental re-
sults by deconstructing them.138 To avoid inconsistency between
these two seemingly incompatible types of discourse, scientists employ
a "truth will out device" (TWOD) to create a temporal separation be-
tween the two types of discourse.139 By employing the TWOD, a sci-
entist is able to dismiss inconsistent experimental results by asserting
130. Id. at 240.
131. Id. at 241.
132. Id.
133. Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78.
134. GmBERT & MULiAY, supra note 125, at 56.
135. Id. at 47, 56.
136. Id. at 47. This omission of equally probable alternatives also contributes to the
process of reification.
137. Id. at 57-58.
138. Id. at 79-82; LxTouR & WOoLGAR, supra note 10, at 23 (scientists emphasize so-
cial aspects in cases of "error").
139. GIBERT & MULKAY, supra note 125, at 91-111.
19951 553
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that the error 140 producing the inconsistency will eventually be dis-
covered and exposed. Put differently, the empiricist repertoire is justi-
fied by using the contingent repertoire to describe inconsistencies and
positing that eventually the truth of the empiricist statements will
"out." This procedure dismisses the contingencies involved in experi-
mentation and thus restores the primacy of the empiricist reper-
toire.'4 1 This insistence of the scientific community on engaging in
empiricist repertoire leads many outside observers to complain that
scientists routinely misrepresent their true activities.142
5. The contingent products of scientific communities are reified.
The fifth element of an account of the sociology of science is the
concept of "reification." Reification describes what happens to a fact-
statement once it stabilizes within the agonistic field through the pro-
gressive elimination of modalities.'4 3 When a statement becomes re-
ified, it loses all its original connections to human activity and
becomes, as the Latin implies, "thing-ified." Reification is "the appre-
hension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-
human or possibly supra-human terms."'144 Reification has a tempo-
ral element, for as the modalities of a statement are progressively
eliminated through successive inscriptions, the statement becomes in-
creasingly fact-like. For example, a study of the social construction of
the neuroendocrinological "fact" that the chemical structure of the re-
leasing agent 45 known as TRF is Pyro-Glu-His-Pro-NH 2146 resulted
in the identification of the precise point in time at which the chemical
structure of TRF ceased to be a hypothesis posited by a pair of experi-
mental neuroendocrinologists, and instead became accepted as an ex-
ternalized fact of nature.147
The phenomena of contingency and reification are elucidated by a
model consisting of a series of five statement types. A Type 5 state-
ment is one that (in the course of communicating some other fact)
communicates implicit taken-for-granted knowledge.148 A Type 4
statement is of the form "A has a certain relation to B."149 These
140. In order to avoid the creation of an anomaly for the existing paradigm, the adher-
ent must posit that the aberrant result was due to an error.
141. GILBERT & MuLxAy, supra note 125, at 110.
142. LATouR & WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 28.
143. Id. at 238.
144. BERGER & LucKimA'N, supra note 101, at 89.
145. Releasing agents are chemicals of a peptidic nature which are emitted by the
brain and which allow the brain to control the endocrine system. LToura &
WOOLGAR, supra note 10, at 55-56.
146. Id. at 175.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 76-77.
149. Id. at 77.
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statements are rare inthe laboratory, but quite frequent in texts.1 5o
The difference between Type 5 and Type 4 statements is illustrated by
an epidemiologist's statement that, "Smoking causes lung cancer."
This statement is a Type 4 statement about the relation between
smoking and lung cancer, but it is also an implicit Type 5 statement
about the causal relation. If the uninitiated were to ask about the
causal relation, she would receive a lecture on the Henle-Koch-Evans
Postulates.ll A Type 3 statement is a Type 4 statement with a mo-
dality such as "It is thought that," "It was reported that," or "It is be-
lieved that" attached to it.152 Thus, the statement "It is believed that
smoking causes lung cancer" is a Type 3 statement. A Type 2 state-
ment is similar to a Type 3 statement except that the statement is
phrased so that it appears to be more like a claim or an assertion than
an accepted fact.153 These statements frequently contain first or
third-person references to specific researchers. Lastly, a Type 1 state-
ment is a single scientist's conjecture or speculation. 15 4
As a statement moves from a Type 1 toward a Type 5 statement, it
becomes progressively reified, and the modalities and original authors
of the statement are lost.155 Conversely, as a statement is decon-
structed, its history, modalities and contingencies are revealed, thus
moving it from a Type 5 toward a Type 1 status. 156 In addition to
reification through deletion of modalities, a statement may quickly be-
come reified through reliance upon the statement in instrumenta-
tion.1 57 If a statement is relied upon in instrumentation, all future
measurements will implicitly incorporate that statement. Statements
relied upon in this manner quickly become Type 5 statements.
Integration of these five concepts into a single sociological account
produces a picture of a small, highly homogenous scientific community
that is committed to a single substantive paradigm and certain proce-
dural and social conventions. This community seeks to perpetuate its
paradigm through engaging in normal science and abiding by the pro-
cedural conventions that the community shares with the larger scien-
tific community. If non-conformists insist upon challenging the
accepted paradigm or culture, the mechanisms of hierarchy and
boundary work are used to either therapize or nihilate the renegades.
These mechanisms are also used in the selection of fact-statements
150. Id.
151. For discussion of these postulates, see Evans II, supra note 63, at 191-92.
152. LATouR & WoOLGA, supra note 10, at 77.
153. Id. at 78.
154. Id. at 79.
155. Id. at 81-86.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 242; Richard D. Whitley, Black Boxism and the Sociology of Science: A Dis.
cussion of the Major Developments in the Field, in 18 TbE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
MONOGRAPH: THE SOcIOLoGY OF SCiENCE 61 (Paul Halmos ed., 1972).
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from background noise and in the reification of the selected state-
ments. As a result, the scientific "facts," such as causal claims, pro-
duced by this process are highly contingent. They are not individually
true of nature, but are dependent on a host of shared conventions and
assumptions common to the community that produced the fact.
This account of the scientific community provides several chal-
lenges for the law. When scientific "facts" such as causal claims are
introduced as evidence in a legal dispute, these contingent and highly
specialized products of a scientific community must be translated into
a product that is usable by participants in the legal process. Thus, two
types of translation must occur if scientific evidence is to be properly
used by the finder of fact. First, the concepts employed by the scien-
tist must be translated into concepts used by the jury or judge. Sec-
ond, the terms of the scientist must be translated into the terms of the
lawyer. Although the scientist and the lawyer use homophones,158 it
is far from clear that both groups mean the same thing by these terms.
Indeed, the courts' uncritical assumption that scientists and lawyers
mean the same thing when they discuss causation has caused courts
to exaggerate the role of science by failing to recognize the implicit
process of translation.
IV. THE TROUBLES OF TRANSLATION
Ultimately the issue of legal cause-in-fact is decided by the fact
finder, often a jury, which is instructed on the appropriate legal test
(e.g., the but for test) and then applies this test to the facts before it.
When scientific evidence of causation is introduced as proof of legal
causation, the scientific concepts and terms comprising that evidence
must be translated into concepts and terms the fact finder can under-
stand. The unexamined assumption of the courts that scientific evi-
dence of causation is dispositive of the legal issue ignores the critical
process of translation.
The translation of scientific terms and concepts pose two separate
but interrelated philosophical problems. First, if the scientist and the
fact finder possess different paradigms of causation, the concepts of
the scientific causal paradigm must be translated into the concepts of
the legal causal paradigm. Even if most of the terms used by the sci-
entist and the lawyer have basically the same meanings, the para-
digms that employ those terms must be translated. Only when there
is some degree of congruence between the two paradigms is scientific
evidence of causation relevant to the issue of legal causation.' 5 9 Sec-
158. Homophones are terms that sound the same. OxFoRD AiamcAN DICTioNARY,
supra note 1, at 313. Here both scientists and lawyers use terms pronounced
"kawz."
159. Although discussion of other contexts in which a court must assess the legal
value of scientific evidence is beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted
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ond, in addition to the substantive differences created by the existence
of separate legal and scientific paradigms, the scientific and legal com-
munities speak different, albeit homophonic, languages. Not only
must scientific concepts be translated, but the terms used to express
those concepts must be translated as well. 6o
Recognition of the necessity of these types of translation reveals a
risk of mistranslation. Mistranslation occurs when the fact finder as-
sumes that the scientific and legal causal inquiries are more alike
that several analogous situations require courts to perform similar weighing
functions. For example, as a threshold matter, a court must evaluate the proba-
tivity of the proffered scientific evidence. FD. R. Evm. 401, 402. Additionally, in
deciding whether to admit scientific evidence, a judge must decide whether prof-
fered evidence could allow any reasonable juror to find the fact of causation to be
more probable with the evidence than without the evidence. McCormcK ON Evi-
DENCE 340 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
Similarly, in deciding the admissibility of scientific expert testimony under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), a trial court
must decide "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 2796. See also Sorenson v. Shaklee Corp.,
31 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 1994). This task requires the court first to examine the
acceptability of the expert's reasoning within the scientific community. Second,
the court must examine whether, assuming the reasoning is valid for the purpose
for which it was used, the reasoning may be applied to the "facts in issue." Since
the facts in issue involve legal causation, the court must perform a weighing func-
tion and assess whether the reasoning applies to these facts "enough" to warrant
admission. Third, once evidence is determined to be probative, the court must
balance this probative value against the potential for "unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury." FD. R. EviD. 403.
Finally, once scientific evidence of causation has been introduced, the court
must decide whether this evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict. See, e.g.,
Pritchard v. Liggette & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966)(testimony of epidemiologist sufficient to support jury
verdict on issue of causation).
160. The precise translation will differ depending upon whether a judge or jury serves
as the trier of fact. The judge is a legal specialist who speaks "legalese." Jurors
live in a common sense world (assuming that they are not all scientists) and
speak neither science-ese nor legalese, but some species of common sense lan-
guage. Thus, the difficulties of translation assume slightly different dimensions
depending upon whether a judge or a jury determines the issue of causality.
When a scientific "fact" of causation is introduced as evidence to support a jury's
conclusion that legal causation is present, both the causal concepts and the lan-
guage used to express these concepts must be translated into those of the lay
person. This requires translation from the scientific to the "folk" language and
paradigm, and involves the same issues as translation from the scientific to the
judge's legal paradigm.
The astute reader will notice that the same arguments that apply to translat-
ing from the specialized scientific community to the lay (or legal) community also
apply to translating from the specialized legal community to the lay (or scientific)
community. However, in order to simplify the discussion of translation, this Arti-
cle will talk of translation only from science to law, and will subsume both the
jury and the judge under the heading "law."
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than is justified. Mistranslation increases the potential for misleading
the fact finder and prejudicing the party against whom scientific evi-
dence is introduced because of the overreliance upon scientific evi-
dence that results from mistranslation. The most appropriate means
by which to reduce this potential for mistranslation and overreliance
is to ensure that judges understand the difficulties involved in transla-
tion and that they apply their knowledge by bringing these problems
to the jury's attention where appropriate.'61
A. Scientific concepts must be translated into legal
concepts.
The first difficulty created by the translation of scientific evidence
of causation into a legally useful form is that the trier of fact applies a
legal paradigm of causation which differs substantively from the sci-
entific paradigm.162 As noted above, the legal concepts of causation
applied by the fact finder are realist, while the causal models of sci-
ence are contingent constructs dependent upon community conven-
tions and processes. When a scientist states that smoking causes
cancer, she invokes a certain scientific paradigm that not only defines
causation but also governs the conventions for proof.163 Thus, even
assuming the fact finder is familiar with the terms used by the scien-
tist, the concepts relied upon by the scientist must be translated if the
fact finder is to understand the scientist.
The scientist and the lawyer possess different causal paradigms
and for this reason see the world in completely different ways. Even
scientists in one field frequently create paradigms distinct from those
of another scientific field. In fact, the history of science is full of in-
stances where scientists simply live in different worlds because they
possess different paradigms.164 A particularly instructive example is
provided by the "relativity revolution" in physics.165 Space-time and
161. See Jasanoff, supra note 96, at 78-82 (making similar proposal in context of appli-
cations of Daubert).
162. David Carson, Psychologists Should Be Wary of Involvement With Lawyers, in
LAwYERS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGISTS ON LAw 27, 30 (Peter J. van Kop-
pen et al. eds., 1988).
163. For example, the logic governing permissible inferences differs in the two commu-
nities. D.H. Kaye, Proof in Law and Science, 32 Junmiacs J. 313 (1992). Dif-
ferent rules of evidence also apply. Lee Loevinger, Standards of Proof in Science
and Law, 32 JuRmmTaIcs J. 323, 329-32 (1992).
164. See KurN', supra note 3, at 53-62, 68-74 (listing examples from astronomy, chem-
istry and physics).
165. Although this example concerns two scientific communities rather than a scien-
tific community and a legal community, it is nonetheless relevant. In fact, the
example increases in persuasive force as the two communities move "further
apart" because as this occurs, the two communities share fewer common ele-
ments. Thus, the problems encountered by two communities of physicists who
share certain procedural commitments will become even more pronounced be-
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causal laws are intimately connected,166 so an example involving
translation between paradigms of space-time illustrates the prospects
of translating between paradigms of causation. Newtonian physics
was based upon a conception of absolute space and absolute time. 16 7
Although Newton's use of absolute space had been heavily criticized,
these criticisms proved largely ineffective.368 However, repeated fail-
ures to detect the "ether-drift" predicted by Newtonian theory of abso-
lute space, coupled with the acceptance of Maxwell's final version of
electromagnetic theory, which did not incorporate Newtonian ether,
led to the proposal of an alternative paradigm that took the form of
the relativity theories of Lorentz, Fitzgerald and Einstein.169 Because
they operated under a different paradigm, relativity theorists simply
lived in a different world than did adherents to the Newtonian para-
digm.170 The space-time paradigm that each group of physicists ap-
plied provided the world view, or gestalt, that allowed the physicists to
give meaning to their experiences and measurements of the world.17'
As the "relativity revolution" in physics demonstrates, in order for
meaningful communication to take place, the concepts of one para-
digm must be translated into the other paradigm.172 If this concep-
tual translation is to occur, the need for translation must be explicitly
recognized. It is imperative that members of any one paradigm desist
from merely assuming that a single paradigm is shared and that
translation is unnecessary.
B. Scientific homonyms'73 must be translated into legal
terms.
As has already been implied, the legal and scientific communities
differ in several important respects. For example, the legal and scien-
tific communities differ in focus. The scientific community almost in-
evitably is concerned with predictive statements, while the legal
community is generally concerned with postdictive statements.174 In
other words, the scientific community is concerned with applying theo-
tween one set of physicists and a group of lawyers who do not share the same
procedural commitments.
166. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 326-27.
167. KuHN, supra note 3, at 72 (absolute space); LOSEE, supra note 5, at 84 (absolute
space and time).
168. KurN, supra note 3, at 72-73.
169. Id. at 73-74.
170. Id. at 111.
171. Id. at 85, 121-22.
172. Kuhn was initially skeptical whether this type of translation between paradigms
was possible. Id. at 114-15. However, the paradigms involved need not be wholly
incommensurable in order for this problem to persist. Id. at 201-04.
173. A homonym is a homophone that has a different meaning. OXFORD AmRcAN
DIcuoNARY, supra note 1, at 313.
174. Loevinger, supra note 163, at 328; Carson, supra note 162, at 29.
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ries to predict future facts, while the lawyer generally is interested in
applying legal rules to temporally pre-existing facts. Second, the pro-
cedural conventions of lawyers and scientists are different. The proce-
dures used to present evidence and arguments and to arrive at
decisions in the two communities differ drastically.-75 Lawyers rely
heavily upon the adversarial process, whereas scientists rely upon
peer review. Third, the standards of proof and types of permissible
proof differ in each community.176 Fourth, while scientists seek to
cover as many contingencies as possible with a statement, and thus
try to formulate broad generalizable theories, lawyers are usually con-
cerned only with the specific consequences to particular clients.' 77
Lastly, scientists work with levels of degree and quantification, while
lawyers work in terms of categories. 178 These differences serve to dis-
tinguish the communities of lawyers and scientists. Full-fledged
membership in one community is virtually certain to preclude such
membership in the other.
Because of these differences between the two communities, the
lawyer and the scientist literally speak different languages. As the
language of the scientist differs from that of the lawyer, scientific
terms must be translated into terms that have meaning to legal pro-
fessionals and lay persons.179 When the scientist mounts the witness
stand and asserts that experimental research has proven that ciga-
rette smoking causes lung cancer, this statement is not one which the
fact finder immediately understands, although the fact finder may be-
lieve that she understands the statement. Causation is a relatively
complex concept, and notwithstanding the appearance of communica-
tion between the scientist and the fact finder, the homophones uttered
by the scientist may as easily turn out to be homonyms as synonyms.
A famous hypothetical illustrates this point. The simplest terms to
translate are those which refer to "present events that are conspicu-
ous to the linguist and his informant."180 Consider the simplest appli-
cation of such a term: "A rabbit scurries by, the native says 'Gavagai',
and the linguist notes down the sentence 'Rabbit' (or 'Lo, a rabbit') as
tentative translation ... "181 The linguist accepts this hypothesis and
begins to test it by observing repeated uses in similar situations. The
problem with the translation, however, is that the hypothesis is un-
testable. The sensory stimulus eliciting the remark "Gavagai" is not a
simple unitary one. "Gavagai" may refer not only to a rabbit, but may
175. Loevinger, supra note 163, at 332-33.
176. Id. at 329-33.
177. Carson, supra note 162, at 30.
178. Id.
179. Preface to LAWYERs ON PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGISTS ON LAW iii (Peter J. van
Koppen et al. eds., 1988).
180. WLAR vAN OimAN QuiNE, WORD AND OBJECT 29 (1960).
181. Id. at 29.
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also refer to "stages of rabbits, integral parts of rabbits, the rabbit fu-
sion, and rabbithood."182 One of these several potential meanings
cannot be isolated merely by pointing to the sensory stimulus, for
"[p]oint to a rabbit and you have pointed to a stage of a rabbit, to an
integral part of a rabbit, to the rabbit fusion, and to where rabbithood
is manifested."1ss Any attempt to isolate one of these potential mean-
ings requires inquiry into identity and diversity, which in turn re-
quires far greater command of the native's language than has been
justified, given the fact that the linguist cannot connect a single mean-
ing to a simple sensory stimulus.18 4 If one cannot tell whether or not
the native is referring to a rabbit, it certainly seems improbable that
one may accurately translate more complex abstract terms such as
"cause."
It may be objected that the "Gavagai" hypothetical does not apply
to the courtroom because the hypothetical involves two natural lan-
guages, whereas all participants in the courtroom speak a single natu-
ral language. However, the same indeterminacy that plagues
translation between natural languages plagues "homophonic transla-
tion" within a single natural language.1S5 Despite the fact that the
terms used by both speakers sound the same, the meaning assigned to
them may be different. In fact, the appearance of communication
when understanding may be absent increases the danger of mistrans-
lation. If the terms were clearly different, the need for translation
would be obvious and mistranslation would be less of a problem.
Moreover, to distinguish between the courtroom situation and the hy-
pothetical on the basis of the number of natural languages involved
assumes that the speaker and the listener in the courtroom both are
members of the same speech community and speak the same natural
language.S6 However, the segregation of the scientific and legal com-
munities gives rise to the very real possibility that these two commu-
nities do not share a single natural language.187 Rather than both
182. Id. at 52.
183. Id. at 52-53.
184. Id. at 53.
185. ASA KASHER & SHALOM LAPPiN, PHILOSOPHICAL LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION
133 (1977).
186. Id.
187. Much research has shown that segregated communities develop different linguis-
tic patterns and usages even though they apparently speak a single natural lan-
guage. In a very real sense, these communities speak different languages. See,
e.g., SHmuY B. HEATH, WAYS wrrH WoRDs: LANGUAGE, Lum AND WORK IN Com-
MUNrmES AND CLASSROOMS (1983); WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY & LITERAcY: THE
TECHNOLOGZn=G OF THE WORD (1982). For the theory supporting such observa-
tions, see TERRY EAGLETON, LrTERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 5, 127-50
(1983).
In its extreme form, this line of hermeneutical argument insists that each in-
dividual language user is trapped "inside her own skin" and cannot effectively
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speaking a single version of "standard English," the two communities
may speak completely different "Englishes."
This indeterminacy of linguistic references creates a second layer
of problems in translation. The analysis of conceptual translation
reveals that the concepts of the scientist simply may not match legal
concepts. The scientist is engaged in model-building, not in reality-
description. Thus, there is no reason to assume that the models pro-
duced by science have anything at all to do with the realist causal
inquiry of the law. These conceptual difficulties occur even assuming
that a single language is used by both communities. When the addi-
tional variable of language is added on top of this conceptual confu-
sion, it becomes impossible to tell whether the same concepts are used
by both paradigms or not. The conceptual referents of the terms used
by the scientist are simply impossible to ascertain due to the inscruta-
bility of linguistic references. In light of these tremendous philosophi-
cal difficulties, it is a fair question whether the fact finder can ever
properly translate scientific evidence.
C. Solving the troubles of translation: a modest proposal.
The inscrutability of linguistic references to causes and the incom-
mensurability of causal paradigms create serious philosophical
problems whenever scientific evidence of causation is offered as proof
of the existence of legal causation. These problems notwithstanding,
it seems intuitively obvious that scientific proof of causality should
contribute to proof of legal causation. As will be shown, while a theo-
retical basis exists for the use of scientific evidence in the legal arena,
a balance must be reached that takes the difficulties of translation
into account.
The question of the legal use of scientific evidence has two aspects.
The most fundamental aspect of this question is whether there is any
justification for the use of scientific evidence in proving legal causation
despite the persistent philosophical problems with the use of such
proof. If an extreme position is taken as to the inscrutability of scien-
tific references to causes and the incommensurability of causal para-
digms of law and science, the lawyer and the scientist would never
communicate, and scientific evidence would never be relevant to the
legal issue of causation. The use of a single English term to refer to
communicate with others, or at least cannot justifiably rely upon the existence of
such communication. See, e.g., Hazard Adams, Introduction to CRrricAL THEORY
SNcE 1965, at 1, 17-18 (Hazard Adams & Leroy Searle eds., 1986); JONATHAN
CULLEN, ON D.coNsmucrIoN 110-31 (1982); Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This
Class?, in COrrIcAL THEoRY SiNcE 1965, at 525, 525-533 (Hazard Adams & Leroy
Searle eds., 1986). Although this Article does not make the claim made by the
radical deconstructionists, such a claim is not inconsistent with the arguments
made herein.
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both the scientific and legal inquiries obscures the plausibility of this
extreme position. A simple thought experiment removes this obscu-
rity. Suppose that scientists eliminated all causation related terms
from their vocabulary, replacing the term "causation" with "erdich-
tung." A tort plaintiff offers a scientific expert witness to testify on the
legal issue of causation. From the proffer of testimony it becomes
clear that the scientist will testify that science has proven the exist-
ence of erdichtung. The judge, perplexed by this statement, questions
the scientist as to what she means when she says that science has
proven the existence of erdichtung on these facts. In response, the
scientist provides a sociological account similar to that contained in
Part Ill of this Article. Should the judge reject the expert testimony?
Although rejection is certainly plausible, this extreme position is
unattractive; both lawyers and the general public believe that scien-
tific proof is probative on the issue of legal causation. This general
perception provides the theoretical basis for the use of scientific evi-
dence of causation. The chief asset of the legal system is its legiti-
macy.1 8 8 In order to maintain this legitimacy, the courts should be
loathe to exclude evidence which, even on the most extreme anti-real-
ist model, embodies the best guess of a community of intelligent and
highly respected persons as to an explanation of the relevant phenom-
ena. Across-the-board-exclusion of such apparently probative evi-
dence would surely undermine confidence in the judicial system. Put
differently, science works. More importantly, the American public be-
lieves that science works. Thus, since the legal system is designed to
resolve disputes among members of this very public, the abstract
problems of the philosopher should not be allowed to trump the com-
monly held beliefs of the disputants. Notwithstanding the serious
problems created by the introduction of scientific evidence, the parties
involved in the dispute believe that science is relevant to the legal is-
sue. Because of this belief, the losing party is willing to accept the
judgment of a court when that judgment is based on scientific facts.
The key distinction is that the use of scientific evidence is justified by
the public perception of the usefulness of scientific evidence, rather
than the unfounded assumption that science and law both engage in
parallel inquiries into causality.
Having established a philosophical basis for the use of scientific
evidence, a second issue arises concerning the proper balance between
the benefits of the use of scientific evidence and recognition of the phil-
osophical problems created by this evidence. Much has been written
188. JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDicIAL REviEw AND T=E NATIONAL POLTICAL PROCEss: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE RoLE OF THE SuPREmE COURT 56, 129-170
(1980).
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on the benefits of scientific proof.1s 9 Against the background of these
claims and the troubles of translation, it appears that the predomi-
nant problem is overreliance upon scientific evidence through mis-
translation.19o Given the American penchant for things scientific,
there seems to be little danger of underutilization of scientific evi-
dence. Ultimately, the only effective way to prevent mistranslation of
scientific evidence is to call the fact finder's attention to the philosoph-
ical issues involved in translation. This admonition will counterbal-
ance the natural tendency toward assuming the scientific and legal
paradigms are identical by exposing the differences between the
causal inquiries of science and law.191
In order to combat the tendency to assume that science inquires
into the realist causes sought by the law, the jury should be instructed
in a way that brings to its attention the various elements of a sociolog-
ical account of science. By providing this instruction, the jury is given
a framework that enables it independently to assess the probativity of
the scientific evidence on the issue of legal cause-in-fact. The need for
curative or cautionary instructions to correct undesired jury tenden-
cies 192 and the ability of the jury to follow them 193 are both well estab-
lished legal principles.
Thus, when scientific experts are used to establish legal causation,
the jury should receive an instruction that begins:
You will recall that the witness[es] [state names] testified concerning [his,
her, their] qualifications as [an] expert[s] in the field[s] of [state professions]
and gave [his, her, their] opinion concerning whether the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injury.
This portion of the instruction reminds the jury that a scientific expert
has testified and helps the jury to recall the specific testimony to
189. See, e.g., Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 9, at 732; Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K.
Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARv. ENvTL.
L. REv. 441 (1983).
190. Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demon-
strating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 429, 437-40 (1983) [hereinafter
Dore I]; Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard For Evaluating the Use of Epidemio-
logical Evidence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677,
678-79, 688-91 (1985) [hereinafter Dore II].
191. See Dore I, supra note 190, at 439-40.
192. MCCORMICK ON EvDENCE, supra note 159, at 85-86 (discussing use of limiting
instructions where evidence admitted for limited purpose).
193. Perhaps one of the most forthright statements on the ability of the jury to follow
cautionary or curative instructions is that of the Seventh Circuit:
The presumption in our system, artificial as it may sometimes be, is that
curative instructions cure, that admonitions to the jury are taken seri-
ously .... We are not quite so naive as to believe that telling jurors not to
think about something will cause them to forget it, but we trust juries to
behave responsibly and to put aside as considerations bearing on theirjudgment matters that the judge tells them to put aside.
United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 764 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 838
(1986).
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which the instruction is directed, thereby focusing the jury's attention
on the pertinent issues. This portion of the instruction also reminds
the jury that the expert testified concerning her qualifications.
Although the issue of whether the proffered witness is qualified to tes-
tify as an expert is for the judge to decide in the first instance, 194 the
qualifications of the expert are relevant to the credibility of the
testimony.195
The instruction would continue:
The witness[es] [state names] qualified as [an] expert witness[es] due to [his,
her, their] knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Although this
expertise provides the witness[es] with specialized knowledge, it may also
have the effect of giving the witness[es] a vested interest in publishing certain
papers, or in seeing a certain outcome, or in maintaining [his, her, their] sta-
tus, and it does not by itself render the witness[es] any more reliable than any
other witness.
The first sentence of this portion of the instruction recites the lan-
guage of Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 concerning the bases for
qualification as an expert. The first clause of the second sentence of
the instruction also utilizes language from Rule 702 but adds several
cautionary phrases. These cautionary phrases bring the sociology of
science to the jury's attention. First, the instruction notes that the
witness may have a "vested interest in publishing certain papers."
This incorporates aspects of the concept of inscriptions and informs
the jury that a scientific expert's testimony may be influenced by her
desire to produce inscriptions.19 6 Second, the instruction notes that
the witness may have an interest in "seeing a certain outcome." This
portion of the instruction informs the jury that a desire to preserve a
scientific paradigm may affect an expert's testimony.' 9 7 Third, the in-
struction notes that the expert may have a vested interest in main-
taining her status within the scientific community. This caution
partly incorporates the concept of boundary work 95 (viz., to have sta-
tus in a community one first must be within the community) and hier-
archy.19 9 The final clause of the second sentence is a direct
admonition to avoid attributing excessive probative value to expert
testimony based solely upon the credentials of the expert. This por-
tion of the instruction is a direct caution against the assumption that
scientific evidence is dispositive of the legal issue merely because it is
scientific.
The next portion of the instruction is:
194. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., Inc., 34 N.E.2d 367, 371-72 (N.Y. 1941).
195. Id.
196. For a discussion of the concept of inscriptions, see supra subsection III.0.3.
197. See supra section llI.B.
198. For a discussion of the concept of boundary work, see supra subsection III.C.1.
199. For a discussion of the concept of hierarchy, see supra subsection III.C.2.
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When expert testimony is helpful, an expert is permitted to state [his, her]
opinion for the information of the court and the jury. The opinion stated by
[the, each] expert who testified before you was based on certain assumptions
and facts. You may reject the expert's opinion if you find the facts to be differ-
ent from those which formed the basis for the opinion. You may also reject the
opinion if, after careful consideration of all the evidence in the case, expert
and other, you disagree with the opinion or any of the assumptions upon
which it was based.
The first sentence of this portion of the instruction merely refers to the
helpfulness test under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 703. The sec-
ond and third sentences incorporate the concept of contingency.20 0
The jury is informed that the probative value of the evidence depends
upon the acceptance of certain facts or assumptions that may be ques-
tioned. This information effectively allows the jury to consider the
contingent nature of scientific evidence. The phenomenon of reifica-
tion is not specifically mentioned because it would require extensive
explanation, but the concept of reification is implicit in the concept of
contingency. Reification is essentially nothing more than the removal
of contingencies. These sentences also incorporate the notion of para-
digms, which are, loosely speaking, sets of shared assumptions. The
fourth sentence is a restatement of the traditional role of the jury as
the finder of fact.2o1
The instruction concludes:
Moreover, you may choose to discount the expert testimony if you find that it
was directed to a special situation that is dissimilar to the issue of causation
before you. In other words, you are not required to accept an expert's opinion
to the exclusion of the facts and circumstances disclosed by other testimony.
An expert opinion is subject to the same rules regarding reliability as the tes-
timony of any other witness. You should not give any extra weight to any
testimony from an expert who is labelled a scientist merely because [he, she]
is so labelled, and you are expected to rely upon common experience and good
sense. All this evidence was given to assist you in reaching a proper conclu-
sion; it must be considered by you but is entitled only to the weight as you find
it to warrant, and no single piece of evidence is controlling upon your
judgment. 2 0 2
This portion of the instruction accomplishes two goals. The first sen-
tence of this portion of the instruction calls the jury's attention di-
rectly to the translation of concepts. Although no direct mention is
made of the issue of translating terms, the broad language of the in-
struction ("special situation that is dissimilar to the issue of causation
before you") should be broad enough to cover this issue. Specific refer-
ences to the difficulties of homophonic translation are likely to meet
200. For a discussion of the concept of contingency, see supra subsection III.C.4.
201. Patti v. Sylvestri, 376 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1978).
202. This jury instruction is loosely based upon New York Pattern Jury Instruction
1:90 which deals with the issue of expert witnesses. Although substantial por-
tions of the New York instruction have been quoted, quotation marks have been
omitted in order to preserve clarity.
[Vol. 74:529
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION
with little more than the glazed eyes of the jurors. Thus, rather than
risk diluting the impact of the numerous cautions already contained
in the instruction, reference to the translation of terms is simply
merged with reference to the translation of concepts.
This last portion of the instruction also reiterates the proper role of
the jury. Because the primary danger is overreliance upon scientific
experts, the jury is told in several different ways independently to
weigh all the evidence as it sees fit. Instructing the jury in this man-
ner will encourage the jury properly to weigh scientific evidence and
should counterbalance the current tendency to mistranslate scientific
evidence. The jury is an institution that is designed to bring a little
common sense into the courtroom. That institution should be permit-
ted to perform its intended function.
V. CONCLUSION
The law has traditionally applied a but for test of cause-in-fact.
The employment of this test has resulted in the application of two
causal paradigms, both of which seek real causes in the external
world. Juries apply a folk paradigm that sees causation as mutually
exclusive externalized causal chains that exist "out there" in the
world. Judges conceive of causality more technically, seeing it as a
potentially infinite series of externalized causal webs that is limited
by the policy-based doctrine of proximate cause. Notwithstanding
these differences, both the causal chains and causal webs are pre-ex-
isting external realities of nature.
The causal claims of science stand on completely different footing.
They are not true of nature, but are dependent on a host of shared
conventions and assumptions common to the community that pro-
duced the claim. The realist accounts of verificationism and falsifica-
tionism have largely been rejected, and the anti-realist account of the
scientific enterprise provides an account of the generation of "facts"
which is utterly foreign to the law and to the lay person. Scientific
"facts," such as a claim of causation, are manufactured by a small,
highly homogenous scientific community that is committed to a cer-
tain paradigm and that seeks to perpetuate the paradigm through the
mechanisms of hierarchy and boundary work. These mechanisms are
also used in the reification of contingent statements that ultimately
misleads the lay community as to their true nature.
The anti-realist account of the scientific community provides sev-
eral challenges for the law. When the contingent and highly special-
ized products of a scientific community are offered to settle legal
disputes, they must be translated into the legal notion of causation.
The need for translation of scientific concepts and language creates
potentially unresolvable philosophical difficulties. However, the gen-
eral acceptance of science provides a sufficient basis for the admission
1995]
568 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:529
of scientific evidence. The most significant problem with using scien-
tific evidence is the overreliance that results from mistranslation, and
this problem should be cured by the use of cautionary jury instruc-
tions to inform the jury of the sociological nature of scientific evidence
so that the jury may independently translate and evaluate the
evidence.
